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SECOND DEGREE MURDER AND
ATTEMPTED MURDER: CLEAR'S EFFORTS
TO MANEUVER
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
JUDGE MICHAEL P. TOOMIN*

Over a period of nearly two years, the CLEAR Initiative was
engaged in the complex and daunting task of clarifying,
simplifying and streamlining the Illinois Criminal Code.1 As noted
elsewhere in the Symposium, the final product, as introduced by
CLEAR Commissioner, Senator John Cullerton, implemented the
numerous recommendations of the Commission and now reposes
2
with the General Assembly.
One aspect of the Criminal Code warranting the attention
and remedial efforts of the Commission addressed the 1986
legislation discarding the crime of voluntary manslaughter and
creating, in its stead, the offense of second degree murder. The
Commission also focused upon the perceived legal oddity in the
penalty provided for the substantive offense of second degree
murder and the inchoate crime of attempt murder currently on the
books. Consideration was given to the anomaly that allows a
defendant who succeeds in intentionally killing his victim to be
found guilty of second degree murder, with a penalty of four to
twenty years or probation, 3 whereas the offender whose efforts do
not bear fruition may be found guilty of attempt first degree
murder, a non-probationable offense with a penalty of six to thirty
4
years.
With regard to the offense of second degree murder, this
article will identify some of the pitfalls created by this legislation
* Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division. Judge Toomin is also
a Commissioner of the CLEAR Initiative. The author greatly acknowledges
the helpful critique provided by his colleague, Judge Dennis J. Porter, and also
thanks David Friedland, Criminal Division Staff Attorney and Bryan D.

Grissman, DePaul College of Law 711 intern, for their valued assistance in the
development of the article.
1. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 to 5/47-25 (2007).
2. See S.B. 100, 95th General Assem. (Ill. 2007) (encompassing the CLEAR
Commission's recommendations).
3. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (2007) (describing the elements of second
degree murder).
4. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-4 (2007) (providing the elements of
attempt).
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as well the remedial measures later undertaken by the judiciary.
CLEAR's response to remaining problematic areas will also be
discussed, as well as concerns that were addressed by the
Commission, but at the end of the day, left unresolved. Proposed
legislation will also be provided in the hope of alleviating these
concerns, as well as drafts of jury instructions necessary to
implement such changes. However, it should be understood that
the commentary and accompanying proposals are offered solely by
the author, rather than CLEAR.
Finally as to the perceived anomaly resulting from the
disparity of punishment for second degree murder and attempt
first degree murder, the article will address the competing
principles informing our understanding as well CLEAR's proposal
offered as a meaningful response to the problem.
I.

SECOND DEGREE MURDER
A. Some Background

In 1986, the legislature sought to address the confusion that
had developed in some quarters in regard to Illinois statutes
proscribing murder and voluntary manslaughter. At that time,
murder was defined as follows:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that
individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to
that individual or another; or
(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than
voluntary manslaughter. 5
Voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, was defined as
follows:
(a) a person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is
acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender
endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death
of the individual killed; or
(b) a person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual
commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, § 9-1 (1984), amended by ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, §
9.1 (1987).
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believes the circumstances to be such that, it they existed, would
justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article
6
7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.
These problematic areas had earlier been identified by
Professor Timothy P. O'Neill in his scholarly article, "Murder
Least Foul:" A Proposal to Abolish Voluntary Manslaughter in
Illinois.7 His first concern addressed the situation where a
defendant on trial for murder had established entitlement to a
voluntary manslaughter instruction. There, the jury would be told
it could return a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense only if the
jurors found that the State had proven the defendant's
unreasonable belief of justification beyond a reasonable doubt.
The paradox, as Professor O'Neill noted, was that the State,
generally seeking only a murder conviction, would seldom desire to
prove or would prove any such thing.8 O'Neill's second concern
focused upon situations where the jury, having received separate
instructions of murder and voluntary manslaughter, returned
verdicts finding the defendant guilty of both crimes. 9 Recognizing
that such a result was both legally and logically possible under
prevailing law, the professor's proposed solution was to discard the
abiding practice of tendering separate instructions for murder and
voluntary manslaughter and instead adopt a unified instruction
stressing the relation between the two offenses. 10
Finally,
reasoning that voluntary manslaughter was only a less serious
form of murder, O'Neill opined that it would help both courts and
juries to jettison the entire manslaughter terminology in favor of
what he reasoned a more accurate term, "murder in the second
degree."'
As we know, Professor O'Neill's suggestions were favorably
received in Springfield. The legislative response was Public Act
84-1450, which replaced the offense of murder with first degree
12
murder and voluntary manslaughter with second degree murder.
By this enactment, its author, Judge Robert J. Steigmann
proclaimed:
The legislature has rescued trial courts and criminal law
practitioners from the legal morass in which they were floundering.
Without exception, the problems in Illinois homicide law should be

6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 (1984), amended by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 9-2 (1987).
7. Timothy P. O'Neill, "Murder Least Foul" A Proposal to Abolish
Voluntary Manslaughterin Illinois, 72 ILL. B.J. 306 (1984).
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.

12. S.B. 522, 84th Gen. Assem., Public Act 84-1450 (Ill. 1986).
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resolved by the new Act. 13
Notwithstanding Judge Steigmann's bold pronouncement,
from today's vantage point the optimism and predictions heralding
this legislation have simply failed to endure. Particularly with
respect to the offense of second degree murder, hindsight instructs
that the confusion and uncertainty which existed under the
predecessor offense of voluntary manslaughter has hardly abated.
B.

Some of the Problems

Although the redesignation and replacement of murder with
first degree murder was simply a semantic change incorporating
the identical language of the former statute, the legislative
enactment of second degree murder not only repealed the crime of
voluntary manslaughter, but also brought obvious and profound
change. This conclusion is inescapable today, notwithstanding
Judge Steigmann's testimony before the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees:
The statute defining second degree murder was written with the
specific intention of retaining all of the substantive law, both
statutory and case law, previously applicable to the statute defining
14
the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
The newly created offense of second degree murder provided:
A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he
commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraphs
(1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of
the following mitigating factors are present:
At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed
or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently
or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or
At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such
that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the
principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is
unreasonable.
Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion
in a reasonable person.
When a defendant is on trial for first degree murder and evidence of
either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this
Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant
to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence

13. Robert J. Steigmann, First and Second Degree Murder in Illinois, 75
ILL. B.J. 494, 511 (1987).

14. Id. at 495.

20081

The CLEAR Initiativeand Second Degree Murder

before the defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder.
However, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder and,
when appropriately raised, the absence of circumstances at the time
of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing under the
principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. In a jury trial for first
degree murder in which evidence of either of the mitigating factors
defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented and the
defendant has requested that the jury be given the option of finding
the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the jury must be
instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met
his burden of proof with regard to second degree murder until and
unless it has first determined that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder.
15
Sentence: Second Degree Murder is a Class 1 felony.

While perhaps not envisioned in 1986, but clearly so today, is
a recognition the enactment not only conflicted with both existing
procedural and substantive law, 16 but also contained additional
flaws that have now been exposed. Six critical areas of concern
impact upon this appraisal:
The statute infringed upon the powers delegated to the executive
branch by creating an offense which, according to its author, could
not be charged by a prosecutor;
The enactment usurped judicial power by foreclosing a jury from
considering the offense as an alternative to first degree murder,
unless sought by the defendant;
The statute was also in derogation of the judicial power by
precluding a court from entering a guilty finding of second degree
murder in a bench trial, notwithstanding the presence of mitigating
factors warranting that result;
The

enactment

further

compromised

the judicial

power

by

15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 (1987).
16. "Substantive law... establishes the rights whose invasion may be
redressed through a particular procedure." Rivard v. Chi. Fire Fighters Union
Local No. 2, 522 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (1988). A substantive law is "[t]he part of
the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties and powers of
parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (8th ed. 2004). A procedural law is
"that which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion; machinery for carrying on a suit." People v. Ruiz, 479 N.E.2d
922, 924 (1985). In People v. Atkins, 838 N.E.2d 943, 947 (2005), the court
noted "examples of amendments this court has held to be procedural include
one allowing substituted service on the Secretary of State for a former resident
of Illinois (Ogdon v. Gianakos, 114 N.E.2d 686, 689 (1953)), and one changing
a statute of limitations (Orlicki v. McCarthy, 122 N.E.2d 513, 518-519 (1954).
Substantive amendments include those that alter the scope or the elements of
a crime." (citing People v. Glisson, 782 N.E.2d 251, 256-57 (Ill. 2002); People
v. DiGirolamo, 688 N.E.2d 116, 128 (1997)).
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mandating the order of the deliberations to be followed by the jury;
The statute substantively restructured Illinois homicide law by
requiring proof of additional elements or factors to sustain a lesser
grade of homicide; and
The statute diminished the defendant's expectation for
consideration of the lesser offense by abrogating the former
requirement of "some evidence" and replacing it with a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard.
As will be shown, the first three problematic areas have been
addressed and remedied through judicial decisions. Accordingly,
CLEAR proposed that the language of the second degree murder
statute be amended to reflect those changes. In addressing the
fourth concern, the Commissioners recommended that the
legislature discard the requirement that the jury must first
conclude that the State has proven each of the elements of first
degree murder before it may consider whether the defendant has
established entitlement to the less culpable offense of second
degree murder. Although some aspects of the fifth and sixth areas
of concern were considered by CLEAR, given a lack of consensus as
to remedial measures, those flaws remain and will be the
highlighted during the course of this article.
C. Analysis
As regards the first and second problematic areas, the
intention of those who drafted the second degree murder statute
was expressed with bold candor:
Subsection (c) of section 9-2 indicates that the option of having the
jury instructed on second degree murder remains solely with the
defendant. Since second degree murder exists only when the
defendant requests the trier of fact to consider it, the prosecutor
17
cannot charge that offense.
Absent any intent to cast aspersions, while no doubt novel,
the concept of a criminal offense that cannot be charged by the
sovereign would appear to be without precedent in our annals of
criminal jurisprudence. Indeed, under prior law the State's power
to charge the offense of voluntary manslaughter was never
questioned.' 8 It is therefore not surprising that the drafter's
conceptual interpretation was challenged by arguments that the
curtailment of the State's Attorney's discretion to bring the charge
constituted an encroachment upon the executive branch, thereby
violating the separation of powers clause of the Illinois
17. Steigmann, supra note 13, at 496.
18. People v. Ellis, 437 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People v. Millet,

208 N.E.2d 670, 675-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965); People v. Bailey, 201 N.E.2d 756,
763-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
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Constitution.19 Predictably, the limitation on the prosecutor's
right to charge the offense championed by the drafters was
ultimately rejected on appellate review. 20 In People v. Burks, the
court recognized:
The statute does not, however, prohibit the State from initially
charging a defendant with second degree murder. By charging a
defendant with second degree murder, the State is alleging that it
can prove the elements of first degree murder, but is conceding the
presence of mitigating factors. Under these circumstances the
21
defendant bears no burden to prove any mitigating factor.
Addressing CLEAR's second concern, as noted it was the
expressed intent of the drafters that the jury be afforded the
option of considering the charge of second degree murder only at
the request of the defendant. Yet, that pronouncement marked a
clear departure from decisional law holding that a request for a
voluntary manslaughter instruction could be made at the request
of the State or defense, or could be given sua sponte by the court if
warranted by the evidence. 22 Indeed, for well over fifty years
Illinois courts adhered to the abiding principle that an instruction
which correctly states the law and is based on competent evidence
is not erroneous even though it is not in consonance with the
23
theories of either party.
It is further apparent that this unbroken line of precedent
survived the advent of second degree murder, notwithstanding the
novel interpretation of the drafters to the contrary. The issue was
first raised in the First District, where the defendant challenged
the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on second degree
murder, asserting that she was entitled to pursue an all-ornothing defense requiring the jury to find her guilty of first degree

19. See People v. Davis, 583 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting in
dicta that the statute does not violate separation of powers because the State's
Attorney continues to have the power to charge second degree murder); People
v. Willis, 577 N.E.2d 1215, 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the
defendant did not have standing to challenge whether the statute prohibited
prosecutors from charging second degree murder).
20. See People v. Smallwood, 586 N.E.2d 636, 647-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(upholding the State's power to charge a defendant with second degree murder
under the statute); People v. Clark, 565 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(affirming that the statute does not bar State's Attorneys from charging a
defendant with second degree murder).
21. 545 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
22. See People v. Pierce, 284 N.E.2d 279, 282 (Ill. 1972) (finding no error in
the trial court's instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter over
defendant's objection); see also People v. Faulkner, 475 N.E.2d 964, 967 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (noting that "[iut is well settled on murder cases that if there is
evidence which, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime to
manslaughter, an instruction defining manslaughter should be given).
23. People v. Preston, 173 N.E. 383, 389 (Ill. 1930).
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murder or simply not guilty. 24 Her position relied upon the
language of section 9-2 (c) of the Code, providing that where
evidence of a mitigating factor has been presented, "and the
defendant has requested that the jury be given the option of finding
the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the jury must be
instructed ....
"25 The appellate court, however, found defendant's
argument to be unconvincing:
Bearing in mind the context in which Section 9-2 (c) was enacted,
the legislature's use of the language "and the defendant has
requested" that the jury be instructed on second degree murder does
not take on the connotation that only the defendant may request an
instruction on second degree murder and that the state is foreclosed
from seeking such an instruction. If we were to accept defendant's
reasoning, the result would be that a defendant who proceeded by
way of a jury trial would have the absolute right to pursue an all-ornothing defense, but a defendant who elected to proceed by way of a
bench trial would not have such a right. We do not believe this
26
result was intended by the legislature.
An identical result obtained with regard to CLEAR's third
area of concern, that absent the defendant's request, a judge was
without authority to enter a guilty finding of second degree
murder in a bench trial even in the presence of proof of mitigating
factors warranting that result. As noted, it was the express
intention of the proponents of this legislation that the principles
espoused in Section 9-2(c) of the Code, although not articulated,
would likewise apply to non-jury trials:
Even in a bench trial ...it should still remain the option of the
defendant to have the trial judge consider second degree murder as
27
a possible verdict.
Yet, once again, the result envisioned by the drafters was in
sharp conflict with the touchstone for judging lesser included
findings. Notably, in People v. Taylor,28 the Supreme Court of
Illinois concluded that a defendant being tried for murder in a
bench trial had absolutely no right to restrict the court from
entering a guilty finding for voluntary manslaughter. Earlier, the
court rejected the all-or-nothing position advanced by the
defendant, reasoning that where the record contained evidence
supporting a manslaughter verdict, the fact that the evidence
would also have supported a finding that the defendant was guilty
29
of murder was not a matter of which he could complain.

24. People v. Kauffman, 719 N.E.2d 275, 280-81 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999).
25. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(c) (1998) (emphasis added).
26. Kauffman, 719 N.E.2d at 280.
27. Steigmann, supra note 13, at 497.
28. 224 N.E.2d 266, 271 (111. 1967).
29. People v. Green, 179 N.E.2d 644, 647 (111.1962).
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Similarly, in People v. Franklin, no error attached to the trial
court's ruling that the circumstances appearing from the
defendant's testimony, while not sufficient to justify or excuse the
30
killing, were sufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter.
The drafters' interpretation was also shown to be in
derogation of the underlying rationale of other cases where the
defendant urged that because he was either guilty of murder or
nothing at all, the manslaughter finding could not stand.
Rejecting that view, our supreme court, in reliance upon longstanding precedent, observed:
It was the province of the trial judge, a jury having been waived, to
settle the conflict in the evidence and determine whether defendant
acted in self-defense, or, if not in self-defense, whether the
circumstances attending the assault were such that her death at
defendant's hands constituted murder, manslaughter or justifiable
31
homicide.
Moreover, notwithstanding Judge Steigmann's assessment,
case law since the arrival of second degree murder is consistent
with earlier holdings overwhelmingly upholding the trial judge's
rubric to enter guilty findings for the lesser mitigated offense.
Judge Steigmann had prophesized that because a defendant has
the right to preclude a jury's consideration of second degree
murder, he must also have the correlative right to similarly curtail
a judge in a bench trial. However, Professor James B. Haddad, in
a thought provoking article, not only found this premise to be
false, but also questioned whether the conclusion necessarily
followed from the premise:
If a court announces a judgment of second degree murder after the
defendant has objected to that alternative, it is hard to see how the
defendant is going to complain successfully. By definition, the judge
has found all essential elements of first degree murder. A reviewing
court likely will not find any prejudice. If the reviewing court
reverses, it will be because the evidence, as a matter of law, failed to
establish the elements necessary for first degree murder; these
32
elements also are necessary for second degree murder.
Professor Haddad's rationale was mirrored in People v.
Swanson,33 where the defendant submitted that the language of
section 9-2 (c) providing that a jury may be given the option of
entering a guilty verdict of second degree murder only if requested
by the defendant, arguably supported the proposition that a
30. 60 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ill.
1945).
31. People v. Sain, 51 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ill. 1943) (citing Hammond v.
People, 199 Ill.
173 (Ill. 1902)).
32. James B. Haddad, Second Degree Murder Replaces Voluntary
Manslaughterin Illinois: Problems Solved, Problems Created, 19 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 995, 1019 (1988).
33. 570 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:659

defendant alone could make that election in a bench trial.
Rejecting that view, the appellate court found that because section
9-2 (c) by its unambiguous language applied only to jury trials, its
provisions had no application to bench trials. The court further
commented upon what it viewed as the paradoxical nature of
defendant's argument:
He argues that he should be allowed to "roll the dice." Clearly, we
understand why a defendant would take that position under the old
law, but we fail to see why he would do it presently. In effect,
defendant is saying that if he should be found guilty of first degree
murder, he does not want the judge to consider second degree
murder. .... 34
CLEAR's fourth area of concern stemmed from a key aspect of
the statute structuring the order of deliberations to be followed by
the jury. As section 9-2 (c) expressly provides:
.. the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether the
defendant has met his burden of proof with regard to second degree
murder until and unless it has first determined that the State has
proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first
35
degree murder.
Although the mandate structuring the order of deliberations
at first glance might seem rather innocuous, the CLEAR
Commissioners recognized that the potential mischief and,
moreover, the injustice that could flow from this directive was
disturbing. CLEAR considered the following scenario, not merely
an assemblage of hypothetical facts, but rather a reality
experienced by judges who have presided over murder cases in the
Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE - In chambers, at the onset of jury

selection in a first degree murder trial:
Defense Counsel: Judge, we could avoid all of this if my client could
just plead to second degree. What happened here is that after work
my guy, who is an electrician, gets into a tavern pool game with a
guy he'd just met. An argument breaks out between them followed
by some shoving. It briefly subsides, but then, as my client is lining
up a shot, this guy whacks him over his head with a pool cue. My
client is stunned, knocked to his knees. As he straightens up, he is
taken out the rear door; the other guy is taken out front. Now, the
other guy has what appears to be a beer bottle. As they draw near,
my client removes a small electrician's knife from his tool belt to
protect himself. They close and somehow the knife goes into the
other guy's chest. My client was just trying to defend himself.
State's Attorney: We don't agree with that rendition. We believe the
34. Id. at 506.
35. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(c) (2007).

20081

The CLEAR Initiative and Second Degree Murder

evidence supports what we've charged, first degree murder, and
that's what we're going on.
Defense Counsel: Judge, this was a bar room brawl. You know, the
take in the building has always been that any stabbing within thirty
feet of a pool table was voluntary manslaughter. My client will
plead blind to second degree and take whatever weight you give
him.
State's Attorney: I'm sure he will. That pool table business may
have been the name of the game under Jack O'Malley, but it surely
was put to rest when Dick Devine got down here.
Judge: Well pool table or not, it looks like we're going to have a nice
jury trial.
POST-TRIAL - Judge meets with jurors following a verdict of not
guilty:
Foreperson:Judge, honestly we feel real bad about this. This truly
was a case of second degree murder. But you told us not to consider
second degree unless we'd agreed that the State had proved first
degree. Two jurors didn't buy that, so we followed your instructions
and never got past first degree.
Judge: Well, the instructions track the statute. I had no choice but
to give them the way I did.
Foreperson:Just doesn't seem right. I sat on a case like this some
years ago and we had a choice, murder or voluntary manslaughter.
Is this something new? Is this some kind of an improvement?
Judge: Well, we've had it since 1987; I really can't say it's an
improvement.
The foregoing scenario does not represent a mythical
situation, but rather a reality experienced by the author and
colleagues who sit in the criminal courts. Less egregious, but also
disturbing, are cases where jurors, following the express command
of the instruction, have been unable to come to any resolution of
the issues. Perhaps armed with a crystal ball, Professor Haddad
had cryptically predicted:
Additionally, the number of hung juries might escalate if juries
conscientiously adhere to instructions purporting to structure their
order of deliberations. By telling a jury that it can consider second
degree murder only if it unanimously has concluded that the state
has proved every element of first degree murder, a judge may
discourage the kind of give and take that historically has had a role
36
in jury deliberations.

36. Haddad, supra note 32, at 1006. Haddad further observed:
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Professor Haddad also identified other problems flowing from
legislative efforts to dictate the order of jury deliberations:
An additional criticism of the new provision is that the legislature

has mandated instructions that give greater emphasis to the more
serious offense of first degree murder and retard discussion of
second degree murder, even when the court has determined that the
evidence supports consideration of both. Some case law suggests
that courts should not tell the jury to first consider the greater
37
offense and only later to consider the lesser offense.

Professor Haddad also envisioned how this provision would
lengthen and complicate the instructions traditionally given by the
court:
When the legislature directs the order in which juries shall consider
issues in a criminal case, it effectively mandates lengthy, complex
jury instructions, unlike those typically employed in Illinois cases.
By requiring that the jury be told that it must consider first degree
murder rather than second degree murder, the legislature requires
that issue instructions for the two offenses be combined. The matter
becomes even more complex when insanity and guilty but mentally
ill verdicts are possibilities in a case in which the jury is being
charged on first degree and second degree murder...38

As Professor Haddad keenly observed, when only first degree
murder and "passion-provocation" second degree murder are at
issue, the instruction is approximately 435 words long. Add issues
of insanity and guilty but mentally ill and the instruction is now
880 words. And, if you factor in the "unreasonable belief' form of
The problem is exemplified when a judge orders completion of first
degree murder deliberations before consideration of involuntary
manslaughter. A jury evenly divided about whether the state has
proved the requisite mental state for murder would end its deliberations
hung instead of considering the less culpable alternative mental state
required for involuntary manslaughter. The purists might see nothing
wrong with discouraging "compromise" verdicts. Pragmatists would
hope that the jurors would disregard the judge's instruction and use
their common sense, unanimously agreeing on either the greater or the
lesser offense rather than declaring themselves hung as to the greater
offense and going no farther. Accordingly, if they do reach a verdict, it
will only be because the jurors have disregarded the court's instructions
as to the order of deliberations.
Id.
37. Id. at 1005; see also Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, When Should Jury's
Deliberations Proceed From Charged Offense to Lesser-Included Offense, 26
A.L.R. 5TH 603 (1995) (discussing how different courts have handled jury
instructions regarding lesser included offenses). Interestingly, and contrary to
the prevailing practice in Illinois, a number of courts have found the converse
of the situation equally problematic, that is, where the jury is told that it
should not consider the lesser included offense unless it is unable to determine
or has determined that the defendant is not guilty of the greater charge. Id. at
34.
38. Haddad, supra note 32, at 1003.
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second degree, the instruction is lengthened by an additional 45
words. Professor Haddad was led to conclude the instructions
drafted for this provision:
... are foreign to the system of criminal instructions in Illinois,
where simplicity ordinarily has prevailed. Illinois has a modern
criminal code, with crisp definitions of offenses that require little
39
judicial interpolation.
Haddad's final area of criticism addressed separation of
powers concerns under the Illinois Constitution:
... the legislature's role is to define offenses and to provide
penalties. But is it within the legislative purview to mandate the
order in which jurors shall conduct their deliberations? Because of
the strong line of Illinois decisions vindicating judicial prerogatives
as to trial court procedures, it is possible that Illinois courts would
40
strike down this aspect of the new statute.
Professor Haddad's critique clearly resonates to this day.
Although our Constitution does not specifically delineate which
powers belong to the separate branches, the Illinois Supreme
Court has construed the concept of judicial power as including the
adjudication and application of law and the procedural
administration of the courts. 41 Moreover, while the legislature is
vested with the power to enact laws, it may not enact laws that
42
unduly infringe upon the power of the judiciary.
Decisions addressing the issue of whether the legislature has
encroached upon a fundamentally judicial prerogative are
instructive.
In People v. Joseph,43 the court determined a
provision in the Post Conviction Hearing Act directing that all
proceedings be conducted by a judge not involved in the original
proceeding directly interfered with the judicial authority
governing assignment of judicial duties. Similarly, in People v.
Davis, 44 our supreme court found that a statute which purported
to require judges to state their reasons for imposing a particular
sentence violated the separation of powers clause. Likewise, in
People v. Jackson,45 a statute providing that counsel had the right
to directly examine jurors upon the voir dire was held to unduly
46
infringe upon the judicial power. Finally, in People v. Colclasure,
in rejecting defendant's reliance upon a statute affording him ten
peremptory challenges, the appellate court determined that jury

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1007.
People v. Bainter, 533 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ill. 1989).
People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 892-93 (111. 1988).
495 N.E.2d 501, 507 (I. 1986).

44. 442 N.E.2d 855, 858 (111. 1982).
45. 371 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Il. 1977).
46. 558 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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selection, being a matter of trial detail, was controlled by the
Illinois Supreme Court rather than the legislature.
Although the constitutionality of this aspect of second degree
murder has yet to be raised, precedent might well signal the death
knell of the legislature's mandate structuring the order of jury
deliberations. In Illinois, jury instructions traditionally are within
the domain of the judicial power, rather than being within the
ambit of the legislature. Instructions are drafted and promulgated
by the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Instructions
and are recognized as having the full force of the law unless or
until modified or abrogated by judicial authority. 47 Recognizing
that legislative efforts to channel the order of juror deliberations
could well contravene the judicial power, CLEAR recommended
the provision be laid to rest.
D. Clear's Response
It was the sense of the Commission that a portion of the
language of subsection (c) be eliminated to accomplish two specific
goals: first, consistent with existing case law, to clarify that the
State indeed may charge second degree murder; second, to
alleviate concerns that the existing language improperly
structures the order of jury deliberations. Accordingly, part of the
first sentence and the final sentence of subsection (c) was
The proposed
eliminated to accomplish this clarification. 48
modification also eliminated language foreclosing a jury from
considering the offense as an alternative to first degree murder
unless requested by the defendant.
Thus, CLEAR's recommendation to modify second degree
murder provided:
47. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT., R. 451(a) Use of IPI Criminal Instructions;
Requirements of Other Instructions (explaining the preference for using the
IPI, and rules for the use and construction of non-IPI instructions). Rule
451(a) states:

Whenever Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal (4th ed. 2000)
(IPI Criminal 4th), contains an instruction applicable in a criminal
case, giving due consideration to the facts and the governing law,
and the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the
subject, the IPI Criminal 4th instruction shall be used, unless the
court determines that it does not accurately state the law.
Whenever IPI Criminal 4th does not contain an instruction on a
subject on which the court determines that the jury should be
instructed, the instruction given on that subject should be simple,
brief, impartial, and free from argument.
Id.
48. CLEAR Initiative,

Criminal Law Edit, Alignment and Reform

("CLEAR"), Proposed Combined Commentary, Article 9, Second Degree
Murder, 19 (Meeting VIII, September 13, 2006).
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(c) When a defendant is on trial for first degree murder and evidence
of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this
Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant
to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence
before the defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder.
However, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder and,
when appropriately raised, the absence of circumstances at the time
of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing under the
principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. in a jury trial for first

degree murder in which evidence of either of the mitigating facters
defined in subsectien (a) of this Section has been presented And the
defendant has requested that the jury be given the optien ef finding
the defendant guilty of seend degree murder, the jury must be

instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met
his burden of proof with regard t-A sieend degree murder until and
unless it has first dletermined that the State has proven beyond a
reasenable doubt each e-f the elements of first degree murdr 4 9
E.

Remaining Concerns

Unfortunately, CLEAR's final product did not address the
remaining concerns identified earlier in this article. Notably, the
1986 statutory change substantively restructured Illinois homicide
law by requiring proof of additional elements or factors to sustain
the lesser offense of second degree murder. That change, as will
be shown, profoundly impacted upon judicial interpretation of the
superceding statute likewise raising questions as to the nature of
the animal created by the legislature.
Some historical perspective may provide insight into the
problem. Prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961,
Illinois adhered to the common law definition of murder
articulated by Blackstone as "when a person, of sound memory and
discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being and
under the King's peace, with malice aforethought, either express
or implied."50 The distinction between express and implied malice
was drawn long ago in Davison v. People:51
The word malice is defined to be "A formed design of doing mischief
to another, technically called malitia proecognitata, or malice
prepense. It is either express, as, where one with a sedate and
deliberate mind and formed design kills another, which formed
design is evidenced by certain circumstances discovering such
intention, as in laying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges
and concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm, or implied, as,
49. CLEAR, Proposed CLEAR Meetings 1-7, Article 9, Second Degree
Murder, 9 (Meeting VIII, September 13, 2006).
50. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAwS OF ENGLAND
195 (1769).
51. 90 Ill. 221 (1878).
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where one wilfully poisons another; in such a deliberate act the law
52
presumes malice though no particular enmity can be proved."
Conversely, manslaughter at common law was described as
"the voluntary killing of another without malice either express or
implied, and differs not in substance of the fact from murder, but
only differs in these ensuing circumstances . . . ."53 Under the
former Code, voluntary manslaughter was defined as "the
unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, express or
implied, and without any mixture of deliberation whatever. It
must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by
provocation
apparently
sufficient to
make
the
passion
irresistible." 54 While both murder and manslaughter shared a
common factor arising from the killing of a human being, it was
55
the presence or absence of malice that distinguished the offenses.
The 1961 Code, seeking to avoid the use of the difficult
"malice" language, replaced the mens rea requirement in murder
with intent or knowledge.5 6 As a result of that omission, the
mental states required for voluntary manslaughter were rendered
identical to those required for murder, each offense requiring
intent or knowledge. 57 The new Code also broadened the offense of
voluntary manslaughter to include the unjustifiable use of deadly
force, or what practitioners today regard as "imperfect selfdefense."58 Yet, our courts of review continued to view voluntary
manslaughter, as well as second degree murder that replaced it, as
a lesser included offense of murder. 59 Similarly, in an earlier

52. Id. at 229.
53. 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 466 (Robert H. Small 1847).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 361 (1961).
55. People v. Tillman, 187 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ill. 1963).
56. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, par. 9-1 Committee Comments at 17 (SmithHurd 1961). "Subsection (a) (1) is intended to define the two most culpable
types of conduct, which are within the older definition of 'express malice' acting either with actual intent to kill or do great bodily harm, or with
knowledge that death or great bodily harm will (or is practically certain to)
result." Id.
57. People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ill. 1986). The Illinois Supreme
Court observed that:
The definition of voluntary manslaughter in our criminal code does not
contain language distinguishing it from murder in regard to the
defendant's intention or mental state. Voluntary manslaughter is in
relevant part defined simply as criminal homicide committed by one
"acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation" or "acting in the mistaken belief that self-defense justified
the use of deadly force." There cannot be a judgment of voluntary
manslaughter in the absence of one of these mitigating factors. Thus,
murder cannot be reduced to manslaughter unless one of the two
statutory conditions is present.
Id. (citation omitted).
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 9-2 (1963).
59. See, e.g., People v. Fausz, 449 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ill. 1983) (identifying that
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article, Professor O'Neill likewise reasoned that "because
voluntary manslaughter requires a less culpable mental state than
60
murder it is unquestionably a lesser included offense of murder."
An included offense as defined by Illinois law, is an offense which
is "established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a
less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to
establish the commission of the offense charged ....61
Consistent with that analysis, in People v. Hoffer 2 our
supreme court later concluded:
The offenses of murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary
manslaughter are distinguished only by the diminishing degree of
mental culpability necessary to sustain each. While murder and
voluntary manslaughter (unreasonable belief) both require proof of
intent or knowledge ... the offense of voluntary manslaughter is
committed only when the defendant acts with an ureasonable belief
that the killing was justified. This mental state is considered less
culpable, and, as such, voluntary manslaughter is considered an
63
included offense of murder.

Professor Haddad had earlier acknowledged how scores of
Illinois decisions concurred in the lesser included conceptual
analysis, observing that until 1981, no appellate opinion
questioned the proposition. 64 He nonetheless concluded that the
principle conflicted with the statutory definition of an included
offense, reasoning that because the statutory definition of murder
makes no reference to mitigating circumstances, their presence or
absence is irrelevant to a murder charge. 65 He further maintained
that because voluntary manslaughter contains an element which
while voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, the
elements of voluntary manslaughter must be present for conviction on
voluntary manslaughter); Pierce, 284 N.E.2d at 282 (holding that a
manslaughter instruction is necessary when evidence of the elements of
manslaughter are present in the record); People v. Parker, 632 N.E.2d 214,
217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of murder and is in essence a "compromise between murder
and exoneration"); People v. Swanson, 570 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991)
(ruling against defendant's argument that second degree murder is not an
included offense of first degree murder).
60. Timothy P. O'Neill, 'With Malice Toward None" A Solution To An
Illinois Homicide Quandary,32 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 125 (1982-83).
61. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-9(a) (West 2007); see also, Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989) (stating generally that an offense qualifies as
a lesser included offense only if the elements of the included offense are a
subset of the elements of the charged offense and only if the greater offense
cannot be committed without also committing the lesser offense).
62. 478 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1985).
63. Id. at 340.
64. James B. Haddad, Allocation of Burdens in Murder-Voluntary
ManslaughterCases: An Affirmative Defense Approach, 59 CHI. KENT L. REV.
23, 26 (1982).
65. Id. at 27.
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is not also an element of murder, it therefore is not included
within murder. 66
Haddad's analysis led to the anomalous
conclusion that under Illinois law, the offense of murder is actually
included within voluntary manslaughter. 67 Although both offenses
require an intentional or knowing killing, voluntary manslaughter
requires an additional element: the presence of passion6
provocation or of imperfect self-defense.
Haddad's perceived anomaly in the murder-voluntary
manslaughter relationship led him to urge that voluntary
manslaughter instead be treated as a partial affirmative defense
to murder. 69 Under that approach, voluntary manslaughter would
not be in issue until the defense came forward with a certain
quantum of evidence establishing the statutory mitigating
circumstances. 70
The threshold adopted in earlier cases had
placed the initial burden of going forward with "some evidence"
upon a defendant seeking to assert the voluntary manslaughter
defense. 71 Once the defense produced that evidence, the
prosecution would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of mitigating circumstances. 72 If the State failed to do
so, but simply proved the other elements of murder, the defendant
would be entitled to a verdict or finding of guilty of voluntary
73
manslaughter.
Professor Haddad rationally posited that the affirmative
defense approach would bring consistency to the "included offense"
argument. 74 Voluntary manslaughter would truly be included in a
charge of murder because the proof required for murder would

66. Id.
67. Id. at 28.
68. Id. at 28-29.
69. Id. at 45.
70. See id. (recognizing that there was a split of authority as to how much
evidence the defense must introduce to shift the burden to the prosecution to
negate an affirmative defense).
71. People v. Leonard, 415 N.E.2d 358, 364 (Ill.
1980). "We believe that the
evidence in the present case presents some evidence of mutual combat and
that the State's argument concerning the adequacy of provocation under these
circumstances should be addressed by the jury." Id.; see also People v.
Handley, 282 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Ill. 1972) (noting the well settled rule that "if
there is evidence in the record which, if believed by a jury, would reduce the
crime to manslaughter, a manslaughter instruction tendered by the defendant
must be given"); People v. Canada, 187 N.E.2d 243, 243-44 (Ill. 1962)
(observing that where the evidence would allow the jury to find manslaughter
rather than murder, it is reversible error to deny a manslaughter instruction);
and People v. Neal, 446 N.E.2d 270, 273 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (recognizing the
Illinois rule that voluntary manslaughter instructions are properly denied
where the circumstances fail to show even "some evidence").
72. Haddad, supra note 64, at 45.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 46.
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necessarily address every element of voluntary manslaughter. 75
The mitigating circumstances would not be viewed as elements of
voluntary manslaughter, but rather would constitute an
76
affirmative defense to murder.
The affirmative defense approach had earlier been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court in Patterson v. New York. 77
Pattersonvalidated a statute which required a defendant charged
with second degree murder to prove the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence
in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter.78 In so doing, the
High Court noted with approval, that since the advent of the
Model Penal Code in 1962, at least twelve jurisdictions had
employed the concept of affirmative defenses which exculpate or
mitigate, but which must be established by the defendant to be
operative.7 9 Moreover, later, in Martin v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court found no constitutional infirmity attached to a statutory
scheme that allocated to the defendant the burden of establishing
his affirmative defense of self-defense after the State had proved
80
all of the elements of aggravated murder.
Significantly, the Illinois Supreme Court employed an
identical analysis in People v. Reddick,8 ' holding that the issues of
unreasonable belief and heat of passion being issues that the
People's evidence in a murder trial would not raise, reasonably fell
within the realm of affirmative defenses.8 2 As the Reddick court
noted:

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).

78. Id. at 206.
79. Id. at 207.
80. 480 U.S. 228, 233 (1987). The Martin Court held:

We agree with the State and its Supreme Court that this conviction
did not violate the Due Process Clause. The State did not exceed its
authority in defining the crime of murder as purposely causing the
death of another with prior calculation or design. It did not seek to
shift to Martin the burden of proving any of those elements, and the
jury's verdict reflects that none of her self-defense evidence raised a
reasonable doubt about the State's proof that she purposefully killed
with prior calculation and design. She nevertheless had the
opportunity under state law and the instructions given to justify the
killing and show herself to be blameless by proving that she acted in
self-defense. The jury thought she had failed to do so, and Ohio is as
entitled to punish Martin as one guilty of murder as New York was
to punish Patterson.
Id.
81. 526 N.E.2d 141 (Ill.
1988).
82. Id. at 145-46.
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Thus, under the 1961 Code, if a defendant in a murder trial presents
sufficient evidence to raise issues which would reduce the charge of
murder to voluntary manslaughter, then to sustain the murder
conviction, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
those defenses are meritless, and must also prove beyond a
83
reasonable doubt the statutory elements of murder.
Over the years, analytical hindsight demonstrates that the
conceptual relationship between first degree murder and second
degree murder has continued to remain subject to differing
interpretations. The issue was finally laid to rest in People v.
Jeffries,8 4 where our supreme court reaffirmed its holding in
Wright.8 5 By eliminating the requirement of malice from the 1961
Criminal Code, "the drafters. . . removed the element that
and
voluntary
the
crimes
of
murder
distinguished
Reasoning that because both offenses now
manslaughter."8 6
required the same mental state - that the killing be intentional
and knowing - "voluntary manslaughter was transformed from
87
The same
murder minus malice to murder plus mitigation."
rationale led the court to reject the claim that second degree
murder was a lesser included offense: "[h]aving determined that
the mental states for murder and second degree murder are
identical, it is evident that second degree murder is not a lesser
included offense of first degree murder. Rather, second degree
murder is more accurately described as a lesser mitigated offense
of first degree murder."88
The Jeffries court thus adopted Judge Steigmann's reasoning
articulated in People v. Newbern.8 9 Second degree murder is a
lesser offense because its penalties upon conviction are lesser, and
it is a mitigated offense because it is first degree murder plus

83. Id. at 146. The court additionally found that the issue was controlled
by Section 3-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which provides:
Affirmative defense:
(a) 'Affirmative defense' means that unless the State's evidence raises
the issues involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the
issue, must present some evidence thereof.
(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense, other than insanity, is
raised then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the
other elements of the offense.
Id. at 145-46.
84. 646 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. 1995).
85. Wright, 488 N.E.2d at 978.
86. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 594.
87. Id. at 595.
88. Id.
89. See 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (holding second degree
murder to be a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder because the
penalties are lower and because it is first degree murder plus defendant's
mitigating factor).
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defendant's proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a
mitigating factor is present.90 In Jeffries, the court also candidly
acknowledged its part in contributing to the confusion that had
developed over the years, recognizing its prior decisions had not
been exacting in the phraseology used to describe the mitigating
factors of voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder:
For instance, the mitigating factors of "serious provocation" or
"unreasonable belief in justification" have been improperly referred
to as "mental states ... of lesser culpability" (Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at
195) or "mitigating mental states" (People v. Flowers (1990), 138
Ill.2d 218, 241). Such terminology is inconsistent with our decision
today and should therefore no longer be followed. 91
The foregoing discussion is offered in support of the view that
the nature of the animal created by the legislature in 1986 rests
upon a questionable foundation. As we have seen, under the
former Code, voluntary manslaughter was viewed in its traditional
sense as a lesser included offense of murder. That view continued
even after 1961, up to the eve of the enactment of second degree
murder when the Reddick court embraced the affirmative defense
approach in its analysis of murder and voluntary manslaughter.
Finally culminating in Jeffries, the court determined that second
degree murder was in theory, "murder plus;" that is, first degree
murder plus mitigating circumstances.
Given this remarkable transformation, it nonetheless remains
the opinion of this author that the present relationship between
first and second degree murder most strongly resembles the
affirmative defense approach advanced in Reddick. This is readily
apparent from the requirement that to inject the mitigating
factors of provocation or imperfect self-defense into the equation
the defendant must raise the issue by a preponderance of the
evidence. If the defense succeeds, the burden then shifts to the
State to disprove the mitigating factor by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moreover, the affirmative defense approach has
been reinforced, albeit perhaps unwittingly, by CLEAR's proposed
amendment eliminating the structuring of jury deliberations and
the concomitant requirement that the jury first resolve the issue of
first degree murder before considering the effect of mitigating
factors. Additional modifications to be proposed will hopefully
bring further clarity to this problematic area.
However, before reaching those proposals, consideration
should be given to the final problematic area of change resulting
from the enactment of second degree murder. As noted, the
statute diminished the defendant's expectation for consideration of
the lesser offense by abrogating the former requirement of some
90. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 595.
91. Id.
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evidence and replacing it with a preponderance of the evidence
standard. This clearly represented a substantive change in the
law previously applicable to the offense of voluntary
92
manslaughter.
Under former law, entitlement to consideration of the lesser
offense was satisfied where there was evidence in the record that,
if believed by the jury, would reduce a crime from murder to
manslaughter. 93 Traditionally, a defendant seeking to assert the
manslaughter defense had the initial burden of going forward with
some evidence of serious provocation that would warrant such
instruction. 94 Although the defendant's theory of defense might
rest upon a very tenuous evidentiary foundation, it must be of
such a nature that, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime
of murder to manslaughter. 95 Essentially, the defendant was
entitled to the benefit of any defense supported by the evidence,
notwithstanding its inconsistency with his own testimony.96 The
decision to allow the lesser offense to be submitted to the jury
clearly hinged upon a question of law. By so instructing the jury
and providing verdict forms for the lesser offense, the trial judge
had clearly concluded as a matter of law that the requisite
quantum of evidence had been placed before the jury.
In allocating the burden of proof, the pertinent language of
the second degree murder statute initially suggests that it follows
the established rule recognizing that some evidence of the
mitigating factors be presented either by the prosecution or the
defense. The statute then deviates from the traditional standard
by providing that when such evidence has been presented the
burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either mitigating
factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant can
avoid a conviction for first degree murder. 97 Our pattern jury

92. See, e.g., People v. Shumpert, 533 N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (Ill. 1989) (holding
the new homicide statute to be an ex post facto law if applied retroactively
because it increased defendant's burden regarding mitigation from "some
evidence" to preponderance of the evidence).
93. See, e.g., People v. Austin, 549 N.E.2d 331, 333-34 (Ill. 1989) (affirming
the circuit court's rejection of defendant's tendered jury instruction on
voluntary manslaughter where there was "no evidence" of mutual combat);
People v. Harris, 134 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 1956) (upholding the state's
tendered jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter where there was
evidence of provocation); People v. Brown, 112 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. 1953)
(affirming a voluntary manslaughter conviction where the jury apparently
believed the defendant was intoxicated to the point that his power of
reasoning was suspended).
94. People v. Seaberry, 380 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
95. People v. Dortch, 314 N.E.2d 324, 325-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
96. People v. Scalisi, 154 N.E.2d 715, 721 (111. 1926).
97. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (2007).
The Illinois Supreme Court
observed:
Under the new Act, the State still bears the burden to prove beyond a
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instructions mirror those requirements by directing the jury to
consider all of the evidence bearing on this question and
additionally provide that where the only evidence of second degree
murder has come out during the prosecution's side of the case, at
the defendant's option the jury is to be told that the defense is not
required to present any evidence in order to establish the existence
of a mitigating factor. 9s
Recognizing, that in many cases the sole evidence of
provocation or imperfect self-defense comes from the State's casein-chief, the potential for confusion is readily apparent. Adhering
to the mandate of the statute, the judge first tells the jurors that
they are to determine whether evidence of a mitigating factor has
been presented, regardless of the source. Next, the jurors are
admonished that it is the defendant's burden to prove the
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, yet in the
same breath the judge cautions that the defense need not present
any evidence to establish that a mitigating factor has indeed been
presented. Under this scenario, one that is familiar to experienced
judges and practitioners alike, one could well express amazement
that the average lay juror is able to conclude that the defendant
has proved the mitigating factor by the requisite burden or for that
matter, has proved anything at all.
Professor Haddad voiced additional concerns over the
potential for confusion when jurors must be instructed as to
differing burdens of persuasion. On some issues, the burden is on
the State to prove those propositions beyond a reasonable doubt,
but as to others the burden is now on the defendant to establish
those factors by the preponderance standard. As Haddad noted,
the complexity is aggravated when the "unreasonable belief' type
of second degree murder is in issue:
..
the court must instruct the jury that to establish elements of first
degree murder the state has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of a reasonable belief in the existence
of justifying facts, but that to reduce the offense to second degree
murder, the defendant has the burden of proving by a
preponderanceof the evidence the presence of an unreasonable belief
in the existence of justifying facts. 99

reasonable doubt, the elements of first degree murder. However, the
defendant now bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, one of the factors in mitigation which must be present to
reduce an offense of first degree murder to second degree murder. Thus,
the new Act not only requires the defendant to come forward with some
evidence of a factor in mitigation; it requires the defendant to prove, by
a preponderanceof the evidence, a factor in mitigation.
Shumpert, 533 N.E.2d at 1109 (citations omitted).
98. ILL. SUP. CT. COMM., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: IPI

CRIMINAL, § 2.03A (4th ed. 2000).
99. Haddad, supra note 32, at 1002; see also Ill. Sup. Ct. Comm., Illinois

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:659

As noted, the allocation of burdens in our present enactment
was patterned in part after a New York statute providing that the
defendant had the burden of affirmatively establishing the
existence of extreme emotional distress to reduce the grade of
homicide to manslaughter. 100 The United States Supreme Court
found that statute to conform to due process requirements
notwithstanding the claim that it placed an unconstitutional
burden upon the defendant. 0 1 Although the constitutionality of
this aspect of our own statute has also been upheld,10 2 recognition
that the requirement is constitutional does not support the view
that it was borne of necessity or otherwise of merit.
F. Other Jurisdictions
Having developed some understanding of the problems
created by the advent of second degree murder in Illinois, further
insight might be gleaned from the teaching of other states.
Interestingly, a survey of other jurisdictions reveals that the
majority of states, even today, continue to view second degree
murder or voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of
03
first degree murder.1
Pattern Jury Instructions:IPI Criminal, § 7.06 (4th ed. 2000) (instructing the
jury on the burdens involved with second degree murder: the state has to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt while the defendant has to prove a
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence).
100. Steigmann, supra note 13, at 495.
101. Patterson,432 U.S. at 210.
102. People v. Buckner, 561 N.E.2d 335, 341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3 (2007) (defining manslaughter as
"recklessly caus[ing] the death of another person"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1103
(2007) (classifying as second degree murder a death resulting from a "heat of
passion" killing); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (2007) (defining manslaughter as
an "emotional killing"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187, 192(a) (2008) (stating that
voluntary manslaughter is the result of a "sudden quarrel or heat of passion");
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-103(3)(b) (2007) (explaining second degree murder as
"heat of passion" killing); DEL. CODE ANN. § 632 (2007) (categorizing second
degree murder as "intentionally caus[ing] the death of another person under
circumstances which do not constitute murder"); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2
(2007) (defining voluntary manslaughter as "murder resulting from sudden
provocation"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4006 (2007) (characterizing voluntary
manslaughter as a "heat of passion" killing); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.4 (2008)
(defining voluntary manslaughter as a passion killing); KAN. STAT. ANN. §213403 (2006) (portraying voluntary manslaughter as killing with intent as a
result of sudden passion); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (2008) (explaining
that a person will not be guilty of murder if the person acted under extreme
emotional circumstances); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (2008) (defining
manslaughter as sudden provocation killing); MD. CODE ANN. § 2-204 (2007)
(ratifying second degree murder as "murder that is not in the first degree");
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.321 (2008) (stating that anyone who commits
manslaughter will be "guilty of a felony"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20 (West
2007) (formulating manslaughter as causing the death of another person "in
the heat of passion"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 (2007) (defining
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In those states, the lesser included approach understandably
flows from the mens rea distinguishing the greater degrees of
murder from the lesser grades of homicide. Thus, in some fourteen
states "malice" or "malice aforethought" continues to be the mental
state required for the most serious grades of murder. 104
Another grouping, consisting of fourteen jurisdictions,
contains a similar requirement of "deliberation," "premeditation"
or "purposefulness."'10 5 Only eight states require proof that the

manslaughter as a "heat of passion" killing); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.025 (2007)
(classifying second degree murder as a lesser degree offense of first degree
murder); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (2007) (defining second degree murder
as "mitigated deliberate homicide"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-305 (2007) (stating
that manslaughter is the killing of another person due to a "sudden quarrel");
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.040 (2007) (requiring that manslaughter be a
result of a "sudden heat of passion"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:14-4 (2007) (defining
criminal homicide as manslaughter if a person acts recklessly and kills
another); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (2007) (defining manslaughter as killing
due to "heat of passion"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (2007) (reporting that
voluntary manslaughter is a class D felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01
(2007) (finding a person guilty of murder as a class AA felony if done under
extreme emotional distress); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (West 2007)
(explaining voluntary manslaughter to be a "sudden passion" killing); OR. REV.
STAT. §163.118 (2007) (killing in a reckless manner while under extreme
emotional distress constitutes manslaughter in the first degree); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2503 (West 2007) (stating that voluntary manslaughter is the
result of a sudden passion killing); R.I GEN. LAWS § 11-23-3 (2007) (defining
the prison term for manslaughter); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-50 (2006) (stating
that the prison term for manslaughter should not exceed thirty years); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-20.1 (2008) (characterizing second degree murder as a
lesser included offense of first degree murder); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-211
(2007) (killing in the heat of passion is voluntary manslaughter); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2007) (defining sudden passion as "provocation by
the individual killed"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-35 (2007) (defining nonpremeditated killing as second degree murder); VT. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301
(2007) (classifying second degree murder as non-premeditated killing); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (2007) (describing second degree murder as "non-willful
killing"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (2007) (formulating voluntary
manslaughter as "sudden heat of passion" killing).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (2007);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4006 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.4 (2008); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-305 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.040 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1418 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-3 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-50 (2006);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (2007); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (2007).
105. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104
(2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-103(3)(b) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3403
(2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.321 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20 (West 2007); MO. REV.
STAT. § 565.025 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-4 (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (West 2007); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-50 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-211 (2007); V.T. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2301 (2007).
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defendant's acts were performed intentionally or knowingly.10 6
Thus, in the majority of these states manslaughter is viewed as a
lesser included offense because the mens rea of the mitigating
factors is less than the premeditation, deliberation or design
traditionally encompassed within the concept of malice. Hence,
the conceptual framework essentially follows the common law
definition of manslaughter as an unlawful killing of another,
107
without malice.
Interestingly, in allocating the burden of raising the issue of
mitigating factors, a number of states utilize the affirmative
defense approach. Some also have adopted what Professor O'Neill
earlier advocated as a "free-floating burden." 108
Under this
approach, some evidence of mitigating factors may come from the
prosecution's case in chief or be presented on the defense side of
the case. If the mitigating factors do indeed appear from the
evidence, as with affirmative defenses, they must then be
disproved by the state. 109 Thus, in Michigan, provocation must be
"raised by the evidence." 110 Missouri simply requires a "basis in
the evidence; 1 while in Kentucky, the requirement is "something
in the evidence" sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt whether
defendant is guilty of murder or manslaughter. 112 Still, some
states like Alabama and Mississippi place the burden of injecting
113
the issue on the defendant.
As to the quantum of evidence required to warrant
submission of the lesser included verdict, considerable disparity
exists. In South Carolina, to warrant eliminating an instruction
for manslaughter there should be no evidence tending to reduce
the crime from murder. 114 Nevada holds that the jury should
receive a lesser included instruction as long as there is some

106. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 637 (2007); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (2005); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503 (West 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon

2007).
107. HALE, supra note 53, at 466; Tillman, 187 N.E.2d at 733.
108. Timothy P. O'Neill, An Analysis of Illinois New Offense of Second
Degree Murder, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 221 (1986).
109. See, e.g., CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 571 (2007); GA. JURY INSTR.-CRIM.
2.10.40 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20 (2007); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-

103 (2007); NEB. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D. 3.1; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (2007); N.M. UNIFORM INSTR. 14-220
(2007); N.C. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 206.10; S.D. PATTERN JURY INSTR. 3-24-26
(demonstrating that the "free-floating burden" has been adopted in these nine

lesser-included jurisdictions).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

MICH. CRIM. JUR. INSTR. Ed. 16.1.
Mo. ANN. INSTR. CRIM. 3d. 313.04.
KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.030, cmt. 14 (2007).
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2007); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-35 (2007).
State v. Cole, 525 S.E.2d 511, 513 (S.C. 2000).
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evidence, no matter how weak or incredible to support it.115
California judges have a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser
offense if evidence is substantial enough to warrant
consideration.11 6 And, in other states the defendant must prove by
the preponderance of the evidence the presence of the mitigating
factor.117
A second group of jurisdictions treat mitigating factors within
the rubric of affirmative defenses. 118 Professor LaFave observes
that the proper analytical approach views affirmative defenses as
substantive defenses which negate guilt by canceling out the
existence of some required element of the crime.11 9 As to the
burden of production of evidence, LaFave notes that it is uniformly
held that the defendant is obliged to raise the issue by putting in
1 20
some evidence in support of the defense.
Once raised, allocation of the burden of persuasion appears to
be split into distinctive camps.1 21 Some jurisdictions place the
burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove the existence of
the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. For
example, in Connecticut the defendant may mitigate the charge of
murder by injecting extreme emotional disturbance as an
affirmative defense on which the burden is on the defendant to
1 22
establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Washington likewise utilizes the preponderance standard, 23 as

115. Williams v. State, 665 P.2d 260, 261 (Nev. 1983).
116. People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. 1995).
117. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (2007);
4 OHIO JURY INSTR. 503.02; OR. REV. STAT. § 161.055 (2007); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2007), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (2007).
118. Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin.
119. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 1.8(c) 82-83 (2d
ed. 2003).
120. Id.; Another commentator observed that:
A significant procedural difference is also present when a litigant is
forced to bear a burden of production - the judge, rather than the jury
will determine whether the burden has been met. If a judge decides
that the burden of production on an issue has not been satisfied, he will
not instruct the jury on that issue. Accordingly, the defendant will not
receive a jury determination of the issue because, in effect, the judge has
directed a verdict on it.
Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decision Making in Criminal Cases: A
Unified ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321,
329 (1980).

121. LAFAVE, supra note 119, at 83-84.
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a - 55 (West 2007).
123. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A 32.050 (West 2007); see also State v.
Gallagher, 103 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Wash. 1940) (stating that when a defendant
admits to killing, it is presumed to be second degree murder and the defendant

then has the burden of proving that his charge should be reduced to
manslaughter).
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does New York. 124 In Maine, the defendant also has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he caused death
while under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear
brought about by adequate provocation. 125
And, in New
Hampshire, a defendant seeking to invoke the affirmative defense
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance must carry the burden
' 26
on a "balance of probabilities."'
Other states provide that where the defendant has raised the
issue by the required quantum of evidence, the prosecution has the
burden of disproving the defense by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, in Alaska, where the defendant has injected issue of
provocation by some evidence, the State must negate that defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.127 Connecticut similarly provides that
extreme emotional disturbance is an affirmative defense and,
when raised by some evidence, the guilt of the defendant must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue as well as
all the elements of the offense. 128 Hawaii requires the defendant
to raise the defense of extreme mental disturbance by the
preponderance standard and then places the burden upon State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not so acting. 129 In
Indiana, where the defendant raises the mitigating circumstance
of sudden heat by some evidence, it is the State's burden to
reasonable
doubt.130
beyond
a
its
existence
disprove
Massachusetts likewise provides that where there is some
evidence of provocation, the Commonwealth has the burden of
proving the absence of this mitigating factor in order to sustain
the murder charge.' 3 ' And finally, in Wisconsin, where mitigating
circumstances have been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts
constituting the defense did not exist in order to sustain a finding
of guilty of intentional homicide. 132
G. Lessons Learned
The foregoing survey of jurisdictions highlights Illinois'
unique and anomalous relationship between first and second
124. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 2004).'
125. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 203(1)(B) (2007).
126. State v. Soucy, 653 A.2d 561, 564 (N.H. 1995).
127. LaPierie v. State, 734 P.2d 997, 999 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-12(b) (West 2007); see also Taylor v.
Commissioner, 895 A.2d 246, 249 (Conn. 2006), rev'd in part on other grounds,
936 A.2d 611 (Conn. 2007) (providing that the defendant has the burden of
proving the elements of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence).
129. State v. Tyquiengco, 723 P.2d 186, 187 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986).
130. Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002).
131. Commonwealth v. Dempsey, 729 N.E.2d 293, 294 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
132. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West 2007).
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degree murder. Unique, in that no state, other than ours, has
structured its homicide offenses in such manner as to require proof
of additional elements or factors to sustain a lesser degree or grade
of murder. The anomaly, being a recognition that in theory as well
as practice, second degree murder in Illinois is "murder plus" or
first degree murder plus mitigating circumstances.133 As we have
seen, the genesis for that determination was the structuring of
Criminal Code of 1961, transforming voluntary manslaughter from
a lesser included offense to an offense having an identical mental
state with murder.
In reality, second degree murder offered no solution to the
problem. Rather, the preferred alternative proposed by Professor
Haddad and ultimately by the Reddick court, was to treat
mitigating circumstances like provocation and imperfect selfdefense as affirmative defenses. Had the Illinois Supreme Court
spoken earlier we would have been spared the anomaly and
confusion inherent in the illogical and unworkable concept of
"murder-plus." As is often said, this trip would have been
unnecessary. The simplicity of the affirmative defense framework
will become apparent from the statutory and instructional
proposals which follow.
As noted, the final area of concern not remedied by the
CLEAR Commission concerns the allocation of the burden to raise
the issue of second degree murder. Should it be some evidence as
the Reddick court concluded, or should the preponderance
Here, the survey of other
standard now utilized prevail.
jurisdictions is not instructive as the results are rather evenly
divided. However it is the opinion of the author, as well as a
number of his judicial brethren, that sound reason compels readoption of the some evidence standard.
First, when a judge is called upon to decide whether a claim of
self-defense is to be placed before the jury, the question to be
resolved simply is that the record reflect some evidence to warrant
the proposition requiring the State to prove the absence of
justification. Yet, when a defendant seeks to inject the issue of
imperfect self-defense, he must satisfy the higher preponderance
standard. The differing burdens make no sense at all and are
simply unfair. Utilizing the some evidence standard would restore
symmetry between the burden employed in second degree murder
and the statute controlling affirmative defenses.
Second, traditionally the preponderance of evidence standard
has been a burden utilized in civil proceedings. To intertwine that
133. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 595; see also O'Neill, supra note 60, at 109
(providing that under the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, voluntary
manslaughter was viewed by the courts as murder minus malice aforethought,
although it was more consistent with the statute to recognize it as murder
plus extenuating circumstances).
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standard within the context of criminal burdens taxes the
comprehension of lay jurors. A cursory analysis of the pattern
instruction utilized in first and second degree murder where
imperfect self-defense is at issue highlights the problem.13 4 The
jurors are first instructed that the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally, knowingly and
unjustifiably killed the victim. Next, the jurors are told that the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
reasonably believed he acted justifiably, but that his belief was
unreasonable. 135 Then, the jurors are told that the State has the
burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt what the
defendant has offered in justification.
In reading these
instructions, many judges have expressed wonder that the jurors
as well as themselves could be anything but confused. A return to
the some evidence standard in the manner which follows would
eliminate this conflicting and confusing verbiage.
II. ADDITIONAL STATUTORY AND INSTRUCTION CHANGES
PROPOSED BY THE AUTHOR
§9-2. Second Degree Murder
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful Justification
commits the offense of second degree murder when he commits the
offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and with of the following
mitigating factors are present:
(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed
or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently
or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or
(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be
such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing
under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is
unreasonable.
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense
134. ILL. SUP. CT. COMM., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

IPI

CRIMINAL, § 7.06 (4th ed. 2000).
135. ILL. SUP. CT. COMM., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

IPI

CRIMINAL, § 7.05 (4th ed. 2000). Regarding "belief in justification" in Illinois,
the instructions state:
A mitigating factor exists so as to reduce the offense of first degree
murder to the lesser offense of second degree murder if at the time of the
killing the defendant believes that circumstances exist which would
justify the deadly force he uses, but his belief that such circumstances
exist is unreasonable.
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passion in a reasonable person.
(c) When a dcfcndant is on trial for first degrec murdcr and evidence
of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this
Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on thc defendant
to prove either mitigating factor- by a preponderance of the e dene
before the defendant can bc found gilty of occond degrec murder.
Hcwcvcr, thc burd-cn of proof rcmains on the State to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder and,
when appropriately raised, the absence of mitigating circumstances
at the time of the killing establishing that the defendant acted
under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by the individual killed or another, or that he
reasonably believed the circumstances to be such that would justify
or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of
this Code. in a jury trial for first degree murder in which evidence of
either of the mitigating factors defined in oubsoetion (a) of thi-s
Section hao been presented and the defendant has requested that
the jury be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of second
degree murder, the jury must be instructed that it may not oncider
whether the defendant has met his burden of proof with regard to
second degree murder until and unless it has first deter-mined that
the State has proeven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
elements of first degree murder.
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL)
7.04 Issues Where Jury Instructed On Both First Degree Murder
And Second Degree Murder-Provocation
To sustain either the charge of first degree murder or the charge of
second degree murder, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of
-; and
Second Proposition:That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to_

;

[or]
[2] he knew that such acts would cause death to __

;

[or]
[3] he knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to __
; and
Third Proposition:That when the defendant did so,
[1] he did not act under a sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation by another;
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[or]
[2] he did not act under a sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation by some other person he endeavored to kill, but
he negligently or accidentally killed.
[1] If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you should find the defendant go an -with-eu
deliberations to dosids whether a mitigating factor has bcen proved
so that the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of send degree
mawder instead f first degree murder.
[2] If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
first two propositions have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
but an" one of these the third proposition has not been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, your deliberations [on these eha ges
should ond, and you should return a verdict of not guilty [of-first
degree murde-] of second degree murder.
[3] If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that either
the first or second propositions have not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt you should find the defendant not guilty.
You may not .onsidor wh.thorf- the defendant is guilty of the lesser
offenso of second degree mu-ifrdor until and unloss you havs first
determinsd that ths Stats has proved beyond a rsasonable doubt
sash of ths prsviously stated proepositions.
The dsfsndant has ths burden of proving by a prsepon_;dsraneeP. of the
ovidenes that a mitigating factor is proesent so that hs is guilty of th
lesssr offense of ssond degrss murder insts-ad of first dsgcoe
murdsr. By this mcan that you must bs psrsuad d, sonsidering all
the evidoass in this sass, that it is msrs probably true than no.t trus
that ths following mitigating fastsr is prsnt:

that-, the dsfsndnt,.

at thot timsi- ho performsd the asts whish saussd ths dsath of, astsd.
undser a sudden and intonse passion rcsulting from ssrious
proavocation by [ (the dsssassd) (some othsr person hs sndsavors t
kill, but ho nsgligsntly or accidentally kills ths dsssased)].
if you find from "our cosdeaio
f All- the e;i4dcnee that the
defendant has proved by a proponsranos of ths e;Adsnes thata
mitigating fastor is prssnt So thaFt hof is guailty of the lsssr offsnse
of secon;d degree murdsr instsad of firsat degres murder-, you should
find ths dsfsndant guilty of sesend dsgrss murdsr.
if you find f
"our consideration of all the sv4dsnes that ths
defendant has not proved by a prepondoranse of the s-idsnsc that a
mitigating factor is present so;AthaFt -hsis guilty of the lsser offense
of sesend dsgrec mourdcr instsad of first dogres murder, you should
find the defsndant euiltv; of fnst dsffee murder.
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7.06 Issues Where Jury Instructed On Both First Degree Murder
And Second Degree Murder-Belief In Justification
To sustain either the charge of first degree murder or the charge of
second degree murder, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of
-;
and
Second Proposition:That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to __

;

[or]
[2] he knew that such acts would cause death to

[or]
[3] he knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to _
;
and
Third Proposition:That the defendant was not justified in using the
force which he used.
and
Fourth Proposition: That the defendant did not reasonably believe
that circumstances existed which would have justified the killing.
f1l If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you should find the defendant go en -with ye

deliberationso to docido whethor a mitigating factor has-boon proevod
se that the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of seccnd degree
iurdei' instead af first degree murder.
IQj If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
first three propositions have been proved a reasonable doubt, but
anyne.of t
the fourth propositions has not been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, your deliberationo [on these ohargol should
end,-and you should return a verdict of *et guilty [of-fist- degree
iurderj of second degree murder.
[31 If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that either
the first, second or third proposition has not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt you should find the defendant not guilty.

You may not eonoidor whether tho dofondant is guilty of tho loooor
offonse of ocoond dogroe murpdor until and unloos you havo firot
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detcr mincd that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt

each of the previously stated prepositions.
The defendant has the burden of preNng by a preponderance ef the
evidence that a mitigating fa ter is present sc that he is ilty of th

lesser offence of second degree murder instead of first degce
murder. By thic I mcan that you muct be persuadcd, ensidering all
the evidence in thic ease, that it ic more probably true than not true
that the following mitigating factor is present: that the defendan,
at the time he perfcrmed the acts which cauised the death of
believed the circumstances to be such that they justified the deadly
force he used, but hic belief that such efreumstances existed wac
____

unreasenable.
If you find from your concideratien ef all the eNddence

that the

defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that -a
mitigating factor is present so that hc is guilty of the lesser offense.
of second degree murder instead of first degree murder, you should
ifind the defendant guilty of second degree murder.
If you find frEm your consideration of all the evidence that the

defendant has not proved by a preponderance of the cvidencc that
mitigating factor is present sc that he is guilty of the lesser offense
of second degree murder instead of first degree murder-, you should
find the defendant guilty of first degree murder.
III. ATTEMPT SECOND DEGREE MURDER
A.

The Problem

The mandate of the CLEAR Commission also encompassed
what authors and legal commentators have widely perceived as
the disparate treatment of offenders resulting from judicial
interpretation of our inchoate and substantive homicide
offenses. 36 A classic hypothetical serves to highlight the anomaly
confronting a defendant who, having found his significant other
flagrante delicto, fires a handgun at her paramour.
If his
marksmanship fails and the paramour lives, the defendant may be
subject to a greater penalty than had he died. The irony proceeds
from the near certainty that the accused will be charged with
attempt murder, a Class X felony, and, if found guilty will face a
non-probational sentence of six to thirty years imprisonment.
However, if his aim is true and the paramour is dispatched, a jury
may be inclined to find the provocation sufficient to mitigate the
homicide to second degree murder, a Class ifelony with a potential

136. See infra notes 152-55 (citing commentators who recognize the anomaly
created by the fact that there is no offense of attempted second degree murder
in Illinois).

2008]

The CLEAR Initiativeand Second Degree Murder

137
sentence of four to twenty years, or probation.
This disparate result stems from a line of precedent holding
that the crime of attempt second degree murder does not exist in
Illinois. Although the initial focus of the courts concerned the
predecessor offense of voluntary manslaughter, the underlying
rationale of the decisions remained constant; that is, an attempt to
commit voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder is a
logical and legal impossibility.

B. The Background
The notion that an attempt to commit an offense was in itself
a crime came relatively late in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The early history of attempts was traced by the Maryland Court of
13
Special Appeals in Gray v. State. 8
It had its origins in the Court of Star Chamber during Tudor and
early Stuart times. Its crystallization into its present form,
however, is generally traced to the case of Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397,
in 1784... The doctrine was locked into its modern mold by 1801
with the case of Rex. v. Higgins, 2 East 5 .... In the wake of Scofield
and Higgins, it was clear that an attempt to commit any felony or
misdemeanor of common law origin or created by statute, was itself
139
a misdemeanor.
At common law, the crime of attempt consisted of: (1) an
intent to do an act or to bring about certain consequences which
would in law amount to a crime; and (2) an act in furtherance of
that intent which as it is most commonly put, goes beyond mere
preparation. 140 Our Criminal Code mirrors the common law
definition:
A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific
offense, he does an act which constitutes a substantial step toward
141
the commission of that offense.
Since the adoption of our 1961 Code, Illinois judges have
endeavored to resolve the question of whether the crime of attempt
embraced lesser grades of homicide such as voluntary
manslaughter. Over forty years ago in People v. Weeks, 42 the
defendant challenged such a verdict asserting that because an
attempt must involve a specific intention to commit the crime
137. See Fausz, 449 N.E.2d at 80 (delineating the circumstances recognized

to constitute serious provocation under Illinois law as substantial physical
injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest and adultery with
the defendant's spouse).
138. 403 A.2d 853, 854 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).

139. Id. at 854-55.
140.

2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL

LAW, § 11.3, at 211 (West 2003).
141. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-4(a) (2007).
142. 230 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
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whereas voluntary manslaughter can exist where there is no such
intention, an attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter is a
logical and legal impossibility. The Second District agreed:
...An act cannot be both the result of a "sudden and intense
passion" and a calculated goal of prior deliberation. It is either one
or the other but it cannot be both. Consequently, we agree that
there can be no such crime as an Attempt to Commit a Voluntary
Manslaughter. 143
An identical result followed in People v. Reagan,144 where the
court endeavored to determine whether there existed a crime of
attempt voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self defense.
In support of the existence of the offense, the State offered that a
logical interpretation of the statute was that although a defendant
must specifically intend to kill, his intent must be accompanied by
the subjective, yet unreasonable belief that the killing was
justified. In rejecting the State's argument, our supreme court
reasoned:
"As the State concedes, it is impossible to intend an unreasonable
belief. If a defendant intended to kill with the knowledge that such
action was unwarranted, he has intended to kill without lawful
justification and could be prosecuted for attempted murder. In the
case at bar, the defendant intended to defend himself. Although his
belief in the need to defend himself or in the need to use deadly force
was unreasonable, his intent was not to commit a crime. His intent
145
was to engage in self-defense which is not a criminal offense."'
The landscape changed albeit temporarily following the
enactment of second degree murder in 1986. Thus, in People v.
Moore,146 the Third District, in reviewing a conviction for attempt
second degree based upon provocation, observed that the recently
enacted statute required a finding that the defendant had a
specific intent to kill, but that her conduct was mitigated by
provocation.
Reasoning that the intent element was now
unrelated to the mitigating factor of provocation, the court
determined that the defendant could indeed be convicted of
4
attempt second degree murder. 147 Similarly, in People v. Austin, 8
the Second District concluded that the offense of attempt second
degree murder based upon imperfect self-defense likewise existed.
143. Id. at 14.
144. 457 N.E.2d 1260, 1261-62 (Ill. 1983).
145. Id. at 1262.
146. 562 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
147. Id. But cf. People v. Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347, 360 (111. App. Ct. 1992)
(finding that attempted second degree murder was not a crime in Illinois, the

court rejected the view that the legislature had transformed voluntary
manslaughter into a specific intent offense or diminished the applicability of

Reagan).
148. 574 N.E.2d 1297, 1303-04 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
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The key, as the court explained, was an understanding that the
new statute required a two-step process. The jury must first find
the defendant intended to kill without lawful justification, and,
having so concluded, could still determine that the defendant
actually thought the need to act in self-defense, but that he was
mistaken.149
1 50
The issue eventually was laid to rest in People v. Lopez,
where our supreme court rejected the argument that the crime of
attempt second degree murder based upon provocation or
imperfect self-defense existed in Illinois. Although the court
recognized that in Jeffries it had concluded that first and second
degree murder are similar in that they have the same mental
states, what distinguishes the two offenses is presence of
mitigating circumstances which reduce first degree murder to
second degree murder. The court then analyzed the mens rea of
attempt, accepting the State's argument that the intent required
for attempted second degree murder, if it existed, would be the
intent to kill without lawful justification and with either a sudden
passion or an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.
However, as the court concluded,
... one cannot intend either a sudden and intense passion due to
serious provocation or an unreasonable belief in the need to use
deadly force. Moreover, concerning the mitigating factor of an
imperfect self-defense, one cannot intend to unlawfully kill while at
the same time intending to justifiably use deadly force. Thus, the
offense of attempted second degree murder does not exist in this
State.151
Some legal commentators have suggested that the holding
and rationale of Lopez is contradicted by the plain language of the
statute as well as the intent of the legislature. Well before the
advent of second degree murder, Professor LaFave disagreed with
the basic premise of Weeks that because voluntary manslaughter

149. Id. But see People v. Williams, 581 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
People v. Cruz, 618 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); People v. Fletcher,
625 N.E.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (rejecting the Austin rationale,
these courts concluded instead that attempted second degree murder based on
imperfect self defense did not exist in Illinois).
150. 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill.
1995).
151. Id. Conversely, the dissent concluded that attempted second degree
murder is simply attempted first degree murder plus mitigating
circumstances. Id. at 870-71 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Relying upon
Jeffries, the dissent reasoned that in enacting the new statute the legislature
separated the mitigating factors for second degree murder from the elements
which were required to be proven by the prosecution. Id. at 870 (McMorrow,
J., dissenting). Under that analysis, the co-existence of attempted second
degree analysis with the present homicide statute does not require the
impossible situation that the defendant intended to act under one of the
mitigating circumstances. Id. at 870-71 (McMorrow, J. dissenting).
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can result only from serious provocation, it cannot be committed
with an intent to kill.152 Likewise, in an earlier edition of his
authoritative treatise, Professor John F. Decker noted that while
the specific intent required of criminal attempt clashes with the
offense of involuntary manslaughter, it would be logical to have a
crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 153 Moreover, the
authors of the new statute weighed in early in favor of attempt
second degree murder asserting that the specific intent required is
simply the intent to kill, rather than the intent to commit a
specific offense. 154 Professor Haddad, however, parted company
from the proponents, announcing that the same reasons the
supreme court used to deny recognition of attempted voluntary
manslaughter likewise foreclosed recognition of attempted second
degree murder.155
The debate engendered over this controversial question is
further heightened by the fact that the crime of attempted
voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder has been
recognized in a number of jurisdictions. 156 In states such as
Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska and Pennsylvania, as in Illinois, the
157
crime of attempt requires an intent to commit a specific offense.

152. 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 140, at § 6.2 p. 27 n. 88. Or, as
articulated by another writer: "It is inability to restrain an unlawful intent,
not inability to form the intent in the first place, which is the true hallmark of
heat-of-passion manslaughter." Joshua Sacks, Is Attempt to Commit Voluntary
Manslaughtera Possible Crime?," 71 ILL. B.J. 166, 170 (1982).
153. JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND
DEFENSES 167 (1986). Regarding attempted voluntary manslaughter:
[I]t would seem that if a defendant was faced with such a provocation
but failed to take the life of the person he or she was provoked to kill, it
would be attempted voluntary manslaughter in the same way that it
would be voluntary manslaughter if the defendant actually killed the
person. Similarly, if the defendant tried unsuccessfully to take a
person's life while subjectively thinking that it was justified by selfdefense, it would appear proper to hold the defendant for attempted
voluntary manslaughter in the same way he or she would be held for
voluntary manslaughter if the effort to take a life was successful. In
both cases, the mitigating factor that the courts take cognizance of for
purposes of the consummated crime could conceptually be vital where
the effort to take a life failed.
Id.
154. See Steigmann, supra note 13, at 498 (stating that one reason the
legislature changed the name of the crime of voluntary manslaughter to
second degree murder was so that the Illinois Supreme Court would recognize
the crime of attempted second degree murder); see also O'Neill, supra note
108, at 223 (arguing that second degree murder will allow for attempted
second degree murder while voluntary manslaughter would not).
155. Haddad, supra note 32, at 1023.
156. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah.
157. IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (2007); NEB.
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Although not codified in Maryland, its common law adaptation
likewise requires a specific intent. 158 Florida has also recognized
the crime, but requires only a general intent to commit the
59
inchoate as well as the completed offense.1
As perhaps anticipated, in states upholding the existence of
the inchoate offense the rationale differs markedly form the logic
1 60
articulated by Illinois courts. For example, in Comm. v. Burns,
the Pennsylvania court reasoned that a conviction for attempted
voluntary manslaughter was proper where the defendant was
operating under an unreasonable mistaken belief that the
attempted killing was justifiable under a self-defense claim. 161 A
similar result obtained in State v. Norman,162 a Utah case where
the defendant's attempted manslaughter conviction based upon
conduct while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance was upheld as an included offense of criminal
homicide. 163 Moreover, the logic employed by a California court in
People v. Van Ronk,164 while in sharp contrast to the rationale
articulated by our Lopez court is equally persuasive.
It is true that a person cannot plot in advance to kill in the heat of
passion. Such a calculated plan is logically inconsistent with a
spontaneous act committed in a moment of passion. But an
assailant can form an intent to kill even under a paroxysm of
passion. And this is true regardless of whether he is successful or
unsuccessful in carrying out his intent. There is nothing illogical or
absurd in a finding that a person who unsuccessfully attempted to
kill another did so with the intent to kill which arose of out of an
honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity of self-defense.
Under those circumstances, the less culpable person is guilty of
attempted voluntary manslaughter rather than attempted
murder. 165
C. Clear'sAnalysis And Response
In its initial appraisal of the problem the CLEAR Commission
logically recognized that the heart of the controversy stemmed
from the Illinois Supreme Court's construction of the attempt
statute and more particularly its interplay with second degree
murder. The Commissioners understood that since at least 1983,
in People v. Reagan,166 the court had rejected the notion that under
REV. STAT. § 28-201(1)(b) (2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

158. Cox v. State, 534 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Md. 1988).
159. Gentry v. State, 437 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1983).
160. 765 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978).
Id.
217 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

165. Id. at 585.
166. 457 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 (Ill.
1983).

§ 901(a) (2007).
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the structure of our attempt statute it was logically possible to

recognize the offense of attempt voluntary manslaughter, a belief
reaffirmed in People v. Lopez 167 in rejecting the existence of
attempt second degree murder.
CLEAR debated the court's
interpretation of the statute as requiring a specific intent with
regard to the elements of the underlying crime. Carried to its
logical conclusion, to commit the offense of attempt second degree
murder, the person must have an intent to commit murder

resulting from heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, which the
court found to be logically impossible.
In the hope of crafting a workable remedy several proposals
were drafted and reviewed. One simply amended Section 8-4 to
clarify the existence of attempt second degree murder:
Sec. 8-4. Attempt.
(a) Elements of the Offense. A person commits an attempt when,
with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense.
A person commits attempt second degree murder when, with the
intent to commit first degree murder, he does any act which
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense
and either of the mitigating factors168set forth in the statute defining
second degree murder are present.
Next followed a proposal to codify the crime of attempt second
degree murder, expressly removing Section 8-4 from the offense:
§720 ILCS 5/9-XX. Attempt second degree murder
Sec. 9-XX. Attempt second degree murder. (a) A person commits
Attempt second degree murder when, with the intent to kill an
individual, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step
toward the commission of the homicide,, and either of the following
mitigating factors are present:

(1) he or she is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting
from serious provocation by the individual killed or another whom
the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally
causes the death of the individual killed: or
(2) he or she believes the circumstances to be such that, if they
existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles
stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense
passion in a reasonable person.

167. 655 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ill. 1995).
168. CLEAR, Recommendation #20, Attempted Second Degree Murder
(Meeting III, July 28, 2005).
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(c) When a defendant is on trial for attempt first degree murder and
evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a)
of this Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the
defendant to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of
the evidence before the defendant can be found guilty of attempt
second degree murder. However, the burden of proof remains on the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of
attempt first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the
absence of circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify
or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of
the Code.
(d) The attempt statute, Section 8-4, does not apply to this offense.
169
(e) Sentence. Attempt Second Degree Murder is a Class 1 felony.

When neither of these proposals carried the day the
Commission focused on a somewhat different approach of
amending the attempt statute or the Uniform Code of Corrections,
allowing for mitigation in sentencing upon a conviction for the
It was believed that this proposal would
subject offense.170
eliminate the intent issues previously identified because the State
would still be required to prove the elements of attempt first
degree murder, from which the sentence would be mitigated.
Comporting with decisional law, the offense of attempt second
degree murder would remain undefined and unrecognized at law.
At the same time, defendants would have the opportunity to
provide mitigating factors consistent with the rationale of second
degree murder. The proposed change simply added the following
paragraph to the sentencing provisions of Section 8-4:
(1) the sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is the
sentence for a Class X felony, except that...
(E) if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence at
sentencing that at the time of the attempted murder, he or she was
acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by the individual whom the defendant endeavored to
kill, or another, and had the individual the defendant endeavored to
kill died, the defendant would have negligently or accidentally
caused that death, then the sentence for the attempted murder is
171
the sentence for a Class 1 felony.

169. CLEAR, Recommendation #345, Codifies the Offense of Attempt Second
Degree Murder (Meeting VII, date July 27, 2006).
170. See 730 111. Comp. Stat. 5/5 to 5/5-3 (West 2007) (as amended by P.A.
94-1035, effective July 1, 2007) (providing classification of offenses for
sentencing purposes), and 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5 to 5/3.1 (West 2007)
(outlining grounds for according weight in mitigating sen881tences).
171. CLEAR, Proposed CLEAR Meetings 1-7 Bill, § 8-4 (Meeting VIII, date
September 13, 2006).
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In adopting this proposal, it was the consensus of the
Commission that rather than create an entirely new offense, a
virtual impossibility, the proposal provided a better way to
address
the
sentencing
concerns
previously
identified.
Accordingly, a defendant found guilty of attempt first degree
murder could present provocation evidence at sentencing, and if
proved by the preponderance standard would be sentenced as a
Class 1 offender.
Commentators and practitioner alike may question why
CLEAR's proposal did not also encompass imperfect self defense.
Dictates of logic as well as symmetry could well argue for inclusion
of this mitigating factor. As with the substantive offense of second
degree murder, a defendant might well entertain a belief that the
use of deadly force was warranted, but be mistaken in that belief.
However, in rejecting suggestions to include imperfect self defense,
CLEAR relied upon the teaching of Lopez, a defendant who
actually believed that he was acting in self defense should be
acquitted of attempt first degree murder as he did not intend to
172
kill without lawful justification.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article understandably addresses but two aspects of the
formidable challenges confronted by the CLEAR Initiative. From
the breadth of background material, historical development and
present concerns, the complex and daunting task of CLEAR in
identifying and addressing these two concerns, as well as countless
others, should be apparent. As the Symposium demonstrates,
many problems were identified and many were remedied. Yet, as
also shown, concerns remain warranting the attention of the
legislature. Hopefully, they will be addressed as we move onward.

172. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 867-68.

